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FOREIGN CORPORATION'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN LICENSE
EFFECT UPON ITS CONTRACTS MADE IN MISSOURI
OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION'S FAILURE TO
OBTAIN A LICENSE TO DO BUSINESS
WITHIN THE STATE
Practically all of the States have statutes regulating the admis-
sion of foreign corporations. The requirements for admission are
almost uniform in all of the States, and provide for the filing by the
corporation of Articles of Incorporation, Charter, etc., and the pay-
ment of a fixed sum as a fee for a license, which is issued by the State
in which the foreign corporation seeks to engage in business. While
the purpose of all these statutes is recognized by all of the courts to
be the same, it has been impossible to give uniform construction and
effect to these statutes, because they differ in detail, in so far as the
penalty for violation is concerned. A great deal of confusion has
arisen because of the further fact that some of the State courts, when
confronted with a case involving these statutes, have paid no atten-
tion to well established rules laid down by the Federal courts concern-
ing interstate commerce.
The questions involving these statutes that have been presented
for decision in the State courts, are:
First. What constitutes the doing of business in violation of
the statutes?
Second. Of what effect are contracts made in violation of the
statutes ?
Third. What rights has a foreign corporation in a State whose
foreign corporation statutes it violates?
Fourth- Pleading and proof.
WHAT CONSTITUTES THE DOING OF BUSINESS?
It is hardly possible to collect from the statutes a definition of
what constitutes the doing of business within the meaning of such
statutes. Many of the cases seem to indicate that the question of
intent is a very material one, especially when the corporation is en-
gaged in a large business which extends into States other than the one
under whose laws it was incorporated. Much difficulty on this point
will, however, be removed by bearing in mind that the statutes under
consideration are very closely allied to the subject of interstate com-
merce, over which Congress has exclusive control under the Federal
Constitution. It is, therefore, entirely immaterial whether or not such
State statutes expressly exempt corporations engaged in interstate
commerce, because any attempt on the part of a State to directly or
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indirectly burden interstate commerce would be violative of the Con-
stitution of the United States and of no effect. A corporation which
is engaged in interstate commerce need not comply with the provisions
of such State statutes. "To carry on interstate commerce is not a
franchise or a privilege granted by a State. It is a right which every
citizen of the United States is entitled to exercise under the constitution
and laws of the United States."' The power to regulate interstate
commerce being exclusively vested in Congress, it would seem to fol-
low that the decisions of the Federal courts are controlling on the
question as to what constitutes interstate commerce, even though
in parallel cases the State courts have held otherwise.
A direct statement of a Federal court to that effect may be found
in In Re Monongahela Distilling Co.,2 in which the Court says: "The
question of what is interstate commerce is a Federal question, and the
decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Neyens v. Worthing
150 Mich. 580, would not control, even if parallel." Other decisions,3
though not directly decisive of that point, lead to the same conclusion.
The broad proposition as to what may be properly considerd
interstate commerce, and which is accepted by all the authorities, was
stated by Sanborn, in Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. U. S. Rubber Co.,4 as
follows:
"Importation into one State from another is the indispensable
element, is the test of interstate commerce, and every negotiation, con-
tract, trade and dealing between citizens of different States which
contemplates or causes such importation, whether it be of goods, per-
sons or information, is a transaction of interstate commerce."
It will be noted that the contemplation or the intent to import
goods from one State into another, is thus made the most important
element in determining what constitutes interstate commerce. This
definition has been upheld by the Federal courts in all of the subse-
quent cases, as will he seen from a consideration of a few of the
more important ones.
In Dixie, etc., v. Stearns," decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
7th circuit, plaintiff's main office was located at Cincinnati, in the State
of Ohio. It also had warehouses all over the country, including one
in Chicago, State-of Illinois, the one in Chicago being advertised as
1. International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 54 L. Ed., 678;
Same v. Gillespie, 229 Mo., 397.
2. 186 Fed. 220, 1. c. 224.
3. International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, supra; Same v. Gillespie,
supra.
4. 156 Fed. 1, 1. c. 17; 84 C. C. A. 167, 1. c. 183.
5. 185 Fed. 431; 107 C. C. A. 501.
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a salesroom. The court held that a contract made by the Steams
Company at Cincinnati was not affected by State regulations, even
though the order was filled from goods stored in the warehouse in
Chicago, saying, "Neither, in our opinion, is the purchase and sale
of goods at Cincinnati, in the State of Ohio, to be delivered to some-
body in Illinois, from goods already deposited in a warehouse in Illi-
nois for that purpose, doing business in Illinois within the meaning
of the statute."
In Atlas v. Parkinson,' the Court in discussing a similar propo-
sition said, "Even though it maintain a warehouse for the storage of
its property pending sale and until the property loses its character as
interstate commerce and becomes part of the general mass of prop-
erty in the State, the local statute has no application."
The case which perhaps has gone the farthest in upholding inter-
state commerce is Tea Co. v. Evans.7 In that case the Tea Con-
pany maintained a store in Portland, Oregon, which served as head-
quarters for salesmen taking orders for merchandise sold by the Tea
Company, the orders to be filled by the Tea Company in the State
of Washington and shipped to Portland, Oregon, where the orders
were distributed from the storeroom. Occasionally there were sales
over the counter in Portland, Ore., from goods stored away. The.
Court held that Tea Company was not doing an intrastate business in
Portland, Ore., and did not have to take out a license as provided by
the laws, of the State.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has gone as far as any court,
State or Federal, in sustaining the interstate commerce privilege, as
will appear from the case of Security State Bank v. Simmons,8 where
it was held that a contract for soliciting orders for books to be im-
ported into Missouri and delivered by agents of the foreign corpora-
tion directly to subscribers, is a transaction of interstate commerce.
In accord with the cases above cited are Caldwell v. North Car-
olina, 187 U. S. 622, 47 L. Ed. 336; Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S.
507, 51 L. Ed. 295; Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 389, 57 L. Ed.
565, and Davis v. Virginia, 236 U. S. 697, 59 L. Vd. 795.
PLEADING AND PROOF.
While there is some conflict in the cases upon the question of
pleading.and burden of proof, in cases involving violation of the pro-
visions of such sttautes, the greater weight of authority seems to be
6. 161 Fed. 223.
7. 216 Fed. 791.
8. 251 Mo. 2.
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to the effect that a foreign corporation in bringing suit need not in
its petition allege that it has complied with the requirements of the
statute. "Incapacity to sue is a defense that must be made out by
the defendant." 9
This seems to be the settled rule in Missouri. Thus, in Parlin
& Orendorff Co. v. Boatman, 0 the Court said: "It is not incumbent
upon a foreign corporation in order to maintain an action brought
by it to show that it has complied with the statute and obtained a cer-
tificate of authority to do business. Non-compliance with the law is
a matter of defense to be pleaded in bar."
In Groneweg Co. v. Estes,', the Court said: "Moreover, a for-
eign corporation, when suing, need not alleged compliance with the
laws of the State, non-compliance being matter of defense."
In United Shoe Machinery Co.1 2 the Court said: "While we
agree with the defendant that all constitutive facts must be set forth
in the petition in- order to state a cause of action, we are of the opin-
ion that an averment of compliance with the laws was unnecessary and
was a matter of defense."
And in Lynotype Co. v. Hays, 3 the Missouri decisions are summed
up by the Springfield Court of Appeals as follows: "The law is well
settled that the failure of foreign corporations doing business in this
State to comply with the law with reference to obtaining a license, etc.,
is a matter of defense which must be affirmatively alleged by the party
relying on it."
Non-compliance being a matter of defense which must'be affirm-
atively pleaded by a party seeking to avail himself thereof, it follows
that the burden of proof rests upon the party alleging it." Although
the cases are in conflict upon this point, the prevailing doctrine is as
stated. In United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Ramlose, 5 the Court said:
"While there is much conflict between the authorities, we under-
stand the decisive weight of authority is to the effect that the burden
of proof is upon the defendant to show non-compliance by the plain-
tiff with the laws of the State in which it sues."
THE MISSOURI STATUTES.
The terms upon which foreign corporations may be admitted to
9. Dixie, etc., Co. v. Stearns, 185 Fed. 431, C. C. A. 501.
10. 84 Mo. App. 67.
11. 139 Mo. App. 36.
12. 210 Mo. 650.
13. 182 Mo. App. 113.
14. Dixie, etc., Co. v. Stearns, supra.
15. 210 Mo. 650.
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do business in Missouri are set out in Sections 3037 to 3040, inclusive,
of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1909, Section 3040 providing
a penalty of $1,000.00 for the violation by a foreign corporation of
these statutes; "in addition to which penalty no foreign corporation
which has failed to comply with said sections can maintain any suit
or action, either- legal or equitable, in any of the courts of this State
upon any demand, whether arising out of contract or tort."
These statutes have been Before the courts of Missouri a number
of times for construction. Of great importance have been the de-
cisions which have dealt with the -effect of the statutes upon contracts
made by foreign corporations which admittedly were violating these
provisions.
The earliest of these cases is Williams v. Scullin, 6 in which the
St. Louis Court of Appeals held that a contract made and to be per-
formed in this State by a foreign corporation which had failed to
comply with the Act was invalid. It was argued in that case that the
statute -was not intended to effect the validity of the contract, but only
the remedy for the enforcement thereof. The Court refused to hold
that was the effect of the statute but decided that it was the intent of
of the Legislature to strike both at the validity of the contract and
the remedy to enforce it. The question again came up before the
St. Louis Court of Appeals in the case of Heating Company v. Gas
iixture Co., ' and the Court again held that the statute struck at
both the contract and the remedy and that a contract made in this
State by a foreign corporation in violation of the statutory provision
was null and void, and no action could be maintained thereon. The
Kansas City Court of Appeals adhered to this ruling in Blevins v.
Vairley,19 and further held that a subsequent compliance by such cor-
poration with the statute would not relate back and make valid a
contract that was invalid when it took place.
The matter first reached the Supreme Court of Missouri in the
case of Carson-Rand Co. v. Stem, 19 a case upon which there has
been a great deal of comment. Plaintiff in that case, according to
the record, was a foreign corporation and commenced an action by
attachment upon notes issued by the defendant to the plaintiff for
goods sold and delivered. At the time of the transaction in question
the plaintiff corporation had not complied with the statute, nor had
it obtained a license to do business in this State. And it further ap-
16. 59 Mo. Appr. 30.
17. 60 Mo .App. 148.
18. 71 Mo. App. 259.
19. 129 Mo. 381.
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pears from a criticism of a later case on the same subject by Judge
Goode that the agreed statement of facts in the case contained, among
other things, the agreement that plaintiff had for a long time conducted
a lumber yard in St. Louis, and that the notes involved in the trans-
action were issued in St. Louis and made payable there. The evi-
derice further showed that after the commencement of the suit by
the plaintiff it did comply with the requirements of the statute. On
appeal from an order sustaining a motion to dismiss Judge Barclay
held that under the circumstances plaintiff could maintain its action,
and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings .in the
lower court. In discussing the provisions of the statute, Judge Bar-
clay said: "7i statute does not, in express terms, forbid the bring-
ing of a suit by such a company, It declares that it cannot maintain
an action, not having complied with the law. What was the para-
mount object of the enactment? Not to exclude such concerns from
participation in the business done in Missouri, but to compel a com-
pliance with certain conditions by them. Those conditions were im-
posed with a view, probably, to place foreign and domestic companies
on a footing of equality in the field of commerce. The object of the
law was rather to induce observance of those conditions than to de-
prive any foreign corporation of the right of action or other prop-
erty. . . . What are we to understand by the word 'maintain' as
used in the third section? As its structure suggests, it signifies, lit-
erally, 'to hold by the hand,' 'to uphold.' While in pleading it is
defined to mean, 'to support' what has already been brought into ex-
istence. . . . No corporation, having failed to obey this law, can
maintain an action. The corollary is that, when it has complied, it may
maintain the action."
This dedision was construed differently by the St. Louis Court
of Appeals and the Kansas City Court of Appeals in cases involving
the same question which later came before the respective courts.
Thus, in Erhardt v. Robertson,20 the Kansas. City Court of Appeals
adhered to the rulings laid down in Williams v. Scullin, Heating Co.
v. Fixture 'Co., and Blevins v. Fairely, supra; saying: "Our atten-
tion has been called to the case of Carson-Rand Co. v. Ster, in
which the Supreme Court held that though a foreign corporation had
not complied with the statutes aforesaid when it began suit, yet if it
did comply during the pendency of the action and before a motion to
dismiss was acted upon, the motion should be overruled. As has been
before 4tated, the statute declares that on and after the taking effect
20. 78 Mo. App. 404.
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of the act no corporation failing to comply with it, 'can maintain any
suit or action' upon any demand. That decision is based on the mean-
ing to be given to the word 'maintain.' It is held not to have been
used in the sense of 'begin.' And that, therefore, the statute would
permit the action to be brought by the corporation, but that it could
not be maintained except upon compliance with the law. The point
decided by us in this case was not decided in that case. The question
of invalidity of the contract was not discussed or referred to in that
case. The only question decided was raised on a motion and involved
only the right to remain in court. It did not determine how the ques-
tions which might be presented in the court should be decided."
The effect of the Carson-Rand decision as expressed by the Kan-
sas City Court of Appeals in the above case, is directly opposed to
that given it by Judge Goode, of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, in
Lumber Co. v. Simms."1 In this case, which involved the very same
proposition as was presented to the Kansas City Court of Appeals
in Ehrhardt v. Robertson, supra, Judge Goode holds that the effect
of the Carson-Rand decision was to overrule the prior decisions of
the Court of Appeals, and 1iold that the contract is valid, although
no action could be maintained thereon until the corporation has com-
plied with the law. This view is based upon the action of Judge
Barclay in remanding the case for further proceedings. Thus, on
p. 576, Judge Goode says, "Why a party should be entitled to begin
an action on a void contract we are unable to see. A void undertaking
affords no bases for the institution of an action or the rendering of a
judgment. Neither do we see why the Supreme Court should remand
a case of that kind with the ruling that the plaintiff might maintain
the action, if the obligation to be enforced was void." Judge Goode,
in discussing the statute, indicates that such a construction as given it
by Judge Barclay is reasonable and just, and one supported by the
authorities.
This view of Judge Goode is followed by Judge Bland in the
case of Lumber Co. v. De Lisle,'2 where it was said: "The certificate
of the Secretary of State authorizing the plaintiff to do business in
this State was obtained by plaintiff before the trial of the cause.
The defendant objected to the introduction of any testimony by the
plaintiff, on the ground that the certificate of the Secretary of State
was not issued until after the suit was commenced. This objection
21. 101 Mo. App. 569.
22. 107 Mo. App. 615.
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was untenable under the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case
of Carson-Rand Co. v. Stem, and was properly overruled."
Judge Bland, in the case of Lumber Co. v. Simms, requested
that case to be certified to the Supreme Court as being in conflict
with the decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals in the
Zhrhardt v. Robertson case, which was done. While it was pend-
ing in the Supreme Court, Judge Marshall handed down the de-
cision of that court in the case of Tri-State Amusement Co. v.
Amusement Co.2 8 This case contains the first lengthy discussion of
the question involved, and a review of the early decisions of the
Missouri Court of Appeals and also of the Carson-Rand case. The
Court upheld the decision of the Kansas City Court of Appeals
and attempted to reconcile the Carson-Rand case with the other
decisions of the Missouri Courts by holding that the validity of
the contract made in violation of the statute was not involved and
not decided in the Carson-Rand case. And, further, because
"presumably" the contract in the Carson-Rand case was made in
another State and was a valid contract according to the laws of
the State in which it was made. "No point," says Judge Marshall,
"was made, and, therefore, no adjudication was had, as to the valid-
ity of the contract. The only point urged and decided in the case
was whether or not a foreign corporation could 'maintain' an action
in this State without having complied with the laws of this State
until after the action was instituted, but did so comply before the
motion to dismiss the suit was filed." The Court then reviewed
the statute with reference to the intention of the Legislature. "It
is manifest," says the Court, "that it was the intention of the
Legislature to place foreign corporations doing business in this
State and deriving benefit from business done in this State with
citizens of this State, upon an equality with domestic corporations
authorized by the laws of this State, and likewise to require such
foreign corporations to bear the same burdens that domestic cor-
porations have to bear. . The statute strikes at the validity
of transactions or contracts entered into in this State prior to the
foreign corporation becoming locally incorporated. If the statute
had stopped here (Section 1025), and made no other provision,
or provided no other penalty, there would be no room for cavil,
that it was the intention of the Legislature to make contracts
invalid that were entered into by foreign corporations in this State
before complying with the statute. . . . But the Legislature
23. 192 Mo. 404.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol5/iss4/2
FOREIGN CORPORATION'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN LICENSE
went farther and provided by Section 1026 a penalty or fine of
$1,000.00 to be recovered by the State's officers from corporations
that failed to comply with the act; and went further still and, in
addition to the penalty, provided that no such corporation should
be entitled to maintain any suit or action upon any demand,
whether whether legal or equitable, where it had failed to comply
with the statute. . . . The statute prevents foreign corporations
from doing business in this State without first having complied
with the law. Such a prohibition is as effective to make a contract
entered into in this State void as if the statue had in terms de-
clared such contracts to be void." This conclusion is reached
because of what the Court holds to be a general rule of law that,
where an act is prohibited or declared unlawful, it is unnecessary
for the law to expressly declare the act done in violation of the
statute to be void, which rule has been adhered to in Missouri
ever since the case of Downing v. Ringer, 7 Mo. 586.
It follows as a logical conclusion, from the attempt of the Court
to reconcile its decision with the Carson-Rand decision, that a con-
tract made outside of the State of Missouri, and valid according
to the laws of the State in which it was made, would be upheld
and given effect in Missouri courts to which a foreign corporation,
though violating the laws of this State with reference to doing
business without a license, may resort, and this would be true even
though performance of the contract took place in Missouri. It
is also settled that a contract entered into in this State -by a de-
faulting foreign corporation is altogether null and void and no
action either at law or in equity can be maintained. This decision
of course was followed in the Lumber Co. v. Simms, 24 . which had
been certified to the Supreme Court from the St. Louis Court of
Appeals.
Judge Marshall's decision is subject to criticism. because of
his attempt to sustain the ruling in the Carson-Rand case upon
insufficient and untenable grounds, and also because his conclusions
are not supported by the reasons given for them. The opinion was
severely criticized by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in the case
of Manufacturing Co. v. Construction Co.,25 wherein Judge Goode
said: "Plaintiff's main proposition is that the bill of sale given by
the Wendelkin Company to Charles H. Alexander is absolutely
void because said company, a foreign corporation, was doing busi-
24. 197 Mo. 507.
25. 124 Mo. App. 349.
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ness in Missouri without having complied with the statutes. This
proposition was affirmed, so far as any right of the defaulting core
poration is concerned, in the case of Tr-State Amusement Co. v.
Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., decided by the Supreme
Court, 192 Mo. 404. It was decided the other way in Carson-Rand
Co. v. Stern, 129 Mo. 381. In the opinion in the Tri-State case, it
is said the Carson-Rand case falls in the class of decisions con-
struing contracts of foreign corporations made, not in Missouri,
but in the home State of the corporation and valid there. The
opinion in the Carson-Rand case does not state that the contract
was a foreign one and the reasoning of the Court shows clearly
that a domestic contract was in issue. Moreover, the agreed state-
ment of facts on which the case was submitted contained, among
other things, the agreement that plaintiff had for a long time con-
ducted a lumber yard in St. Louis; that the notes in suit were
made and executed in the City of St. Louis, were payable in St.
Louis and that the sales of lumber for which the notes were given
were made in St. Louis. The proposition relied on in that case,
as shown by the briefs, was that this State does not recognize the
rule of some other States, to-wit, that a foreign company refusing
to comply with the laws of the State cannot make a valid contract
therein. . . . The judgment was reversed and the cause re-
manded for further proceedings; an order as entirely incompatible
with the theory that the notes were void. as was the reasoning of the
opinion."
It will be noted that the St. Louis Court of Appeals recognizes
the rule that a contract entered into in another State and valid
according to the laws of that State, will be upheld in Missouri,
even though the corporation seeking the relief of our courts is in
default as to the obtaining of a license. About thils proposition
there can be no doubt, because to hold such a contract void and
non-enforcible would be violative of the constitution of the United
States.
The view taken by Judge Goode of the Carson-Rand case was
upheled by the California Court of Appeals in the case of Black v.
Marble, 82 Pac. 1060. The subsequent decisions of the Missouri Courts
have held that the Carson-Rand case, while not expressly overruled
by Judge Marshall, was overruled in effect and have adhered to the
decision of Judge Marshall holding that a contract made by a default-
ing corporation is altogether null and void. Thus in Farrand Co. v.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol5/iss4/2
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Walker,2 the Court says, "The contract was- void because of plain-
tiff's failure to procure a license to do business in this State and so
far as enforcement of a cause founded thereon is concerned, the
courts of this State are dosed to the plaintiff." And in Kelly Broom
Co. v. Missouri Fidelity & Casualty Co." a case in which, after the
transaction of intrastate business by the plaintiff, it did comply with
the statute and procure a license, the Court held that such a com-
pliance was ineffective and could not validate a contract entered into
before compliance. "It was held in the Carson-Rand case," says the
Court, "that a compliance with the statute before suit was instituted
would authorize the corporation to maintain the suit, even though busi-
ness had been done and a contract made before such compliance. But
that case was in effect overruled in Tri-State Amusement Co. v. Amuse-
ment Co., 192 Mo. 404, and expressly disapproved in Zinc & Lead Co.
v. Mining Co., 221 Mo. 7. We therefore hold that plaintiff, not having
complied with the statute, should be denied the right to maintain this
action." And in Wichita Film & Supply Co. v. Yale,28 decided by
the Springfield Court of Appeals in 1916, it is again held that the
entering into a contract by a foreign corporation before compliance
with the statute governing its admission to do business in the State,
is an unlawful act and the contract is void.
The same ruling was followed in Park Davis Co. v. Mullett 2 in
which case suit was brought in Missouri for merchandise sold in this
State by a foreign corporation, the reply in effect admitting that plain-
tiff was transacting business in Missouri in violation of the statute.
The Court said, "It follows that its business was to that extent, at
least, unlawful and contrary to State policy as declared by the stat-
utes mentioned, and every contract into which it entered in further-
ance of that business was void." The Court further held that a com-
pliance by the plaintiff with the statute prior to the bringing of the
action, but after the contract was entered into, would not put the
corporation into any better position.
In Lewis Pub. Co. v. Rural Pub. Co.,' 0 the Court holds that a
foreign corporation doing business in this State without having ob-
tamined a license cannot maintain an action in any of the courts of this
State for a tort. In that case plaintiff brought suit for damages sus-
tained on account of defendants publishing libelous matter concern-
26. 169 Mo. App. 602.
27. 195 Mo. App. 305.
28. 194 Mo. App. 60.
29. 245 Mo. 168.
30. 181 S. W. 105 (Mo. App.)
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ing it. One of the defenses was that plaintiff was a foreign corpora-
tiotn doing business in violation of the statute governing such cor-
porations and could not therefore maintain any suits. "This record,"
says the Court, " shows total failure on the part of the plaintiff to
comply with such statutes in so far as such independent associations
are concerned, and under the uniform-ruling of this State it has been
held that when such violation is shown in any case brought by such
company in any court-of this State, a recovery therein by it must be
denied."
Prom decisions already cited and discussed and others hereinafter
referred to, it is clear that the rule in Missouri is, as it ought to be,
that a foreign corporation will be denied standing in our courts only
when to permit it to prevail would give effect to a contract entered
into in this State. No other rights are denied such corporation, and
the fact that in doing business in the State it is violating the law, will
not in any way interfere with its right to maintain, enforce and re-
cover upon contracts or transactions which are valid because made in
interstate commerce or because entered into in a State other than
Missouri.
Thus in Roeder v. Robertson 1 and United Shoe Machinery Co.
v. Ramlose,12 the Court held that a foreign corporation could main-
tain a replevin suit for property that had been sold to the defendant,
where the corporation was not licensed to do business in this State.
The plaintiffs in the cases referred to, admitting that the contract was
void when entered into, claimed that no title could pass under a void
contract, that therefore the title still remained in plaintiffs, and that
if the statutes of Missouri were to be construed as prohibiting plain-
tiffs from maintaining the replevin suit, it would be violative of the
Constitution of the United States, which guarantees the equal pro-
tection of the laws. The Supreme Court, however, held that the
Legislature did not intend to prevent a foreign corporation from
bringing suit in any of the courts of this State upon a demand not
involving a contract entered into in this State, and in Roeder v. Rob-
ertson said: "If the corporation had parted with the possession of
its property under the void contract, and is unable to recover the pos-
session without litigation, then the courts of this State are open to it,
and it stands before the law upon precisely the same footing that
residents of this State do-no better, nor no worse."
The Court further points out, in Roeder v. Robertson, supra,
31. 202 Mo. 522.
32. 231 Mo. 508.
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that "it was not the intention of the Legislature to prohibit the en-
forcement of valid contracts made by foreign corporations in their
own States with citizens of this State."
It has also been held in Missouri that the foreign corporation
cannot take advantage of its wrong and defeat a recovery by the other
party for the value of the property received by it or services rendered
to it under a contract made in violation of the statute.
Union Bank Note Co. v. Ajax, etc., Cement Co."
Young v. Gauss."4
Although there has been no serious controversy about the Tri-
State Amusement Co. case, it seems to the writer that a consideration
of the cases, especially the Carson-Rand case, leads one to the con-
clusion that Judge Goode's decisions in Lumber Co. v. Sims, and
Lumber Co. v. DeLisle, supra, contain the correct statement of the
law. Judge Marshall in the Amusement Co. case holds the contract
invalid on the ground that the general rule is that an act done in vio-
lation of a statute is void. This also is the view taken by the Kansas
City Court of Appeals in thrhardt v. Robertson, supra. None of the
decisions from other States cited in those opinions, it seem to us, are
authority upon which reliance could be placed, because the statutes
construed in those decisions were very much unlike the provisions
of the Missouri statutes. It is undoubtedly true that the general rule
of law is, as Judge Marshall states it, that when a statute prohibits the
doing of an act and provides a penalty for violation thereof, and stops
there, any transaction in violation of the statute would be void. The
very fact, however, that the statutes of Missouri not only prohibit
the doing of the act, but provide a fine in addition and also provide
that no suit shall be maintained by the corporation, takes it out of the
general rule and puts it in that class of decisions governed by the
rule of law that the courts will not read penalties into a statute when
the Legislature has itself provided a penalty and could, if it had so
intended, have expressly provided that which the courts are asked
to read into the statutes.
An examination of the decisions cited by the Court in Ehrhardt
v. Robertson, supra, shows that the courts in those States were con-
struing statutes which simply declared that the doing of business by
foreign corporations without a license was unlawful. In none of
those statutes did the Legislature attempt to set out the penalty. It
seems, therefore, that the conclusion reached by Judge Marshall,
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which has not been questioned in the later cases, that the fact that the
statute goes on and provides a penalty, is proof of the fact that the
Legislatures intended such contracts to be void, is wholly illogical and
contrary to the established rule of law governing such cases. Such a
construction is unreasonable, for if the Legislature had intended such
to be the case it could have expressed its intention in a few clear and
simple words;
The rule governing the construction of statutes which themselves
provide the penalty for a violation, is well stated in the case of Blod-
gett v. Lanyon Zinc Co.,35 which recognizes the rule announced in
Downing v. Ringer, supra, but says: "The second rule is that where
a contract or an act in performance of it is not malum in se, and its
invalidity is not declared as a penalty for a violation of a statute,
the Courts may not declare it, and thus affix a penalty not prescribed
by the lawmaking power. . . . While the authorities upon this
question are variant and conflicting in the State courts, the Federal
courts have steadily adhered to the rule, which is sustained by the
better reason and the more persuasive opinions in the courts of the
States, that, in the absence of an express provision of the statute to
the contrary, the innocent contracts and acts of a foreign corporation
which has failed to comply with the statutes permitting it to do busi-
ness in the State where the contracts are made and the acts are done
are, nevertheless, valid and enforceable, because it is not the intent of
the authors of such laws to strike down such agreements and acts when
they are not evil in themselves."
In Fritts v. Palmer,30 the Supreme Court of the United States
distinctly held that a contract made by a foreign corporation with a
citizen of another state, is not necessarily void because the corpora-
tion had not complied with the laws of such other State, and that as
the invalidity of the contract was not expressly provided for by the
statute itself, it was not the business of the courts to read such a
penalty into the statute.
In Harris v. Runnels, 7 the same Court said: "It is true that a
statute, containing a prohibition and a penalty, makes the act which it
punishes unlawful, and the same may be implied from a penalty with-
out a prohibition; but it does not follow that the unlawfulness of the
act was meant by the Legislature to avoid a contract made in contra-
vention of it."
35. 120 Fed. 893, 1. c. 896-7, 58 -C. C. A. 79, 1. c. 82-3.
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FOREIGN CORPORATION'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN LICENSE
Following the cases last cited, the Circuit Court of Appeals, speak-
ing through Sanborn, J., in Dunlop v. Mercer," said: "The general
rule that an illegal contract is void and unenforceable is, however, not
without exception. It is not universal in its application. It is qualified
by the exception that where a contract is not evil in itself, and its
invalidity is not denounced as a penalty by the express terms of or by
rational implication from the language of the statute which it violates,
and that statute prescribes other specific penalties, it is not the province
of the courts to do so, and they will not thus affix an additional pen-
alty not directed by the lawmaking power."
In view of the foregoing Federal decisions which announce the
exception under which the Missouri statute naturally falls; and in
view of the fact that the reasoning of the Court in the Tri-State
Amusement case is irreconcilable with that and the decision in the
Carson-Rand case, which has never been overruled by the Supreme
Court, it would seem that if the question were presented anew the
Tri-State Amusement case would probably be overruled and effect
given to the interpretation given to the statute by Judge Goode of the
St. Louis Court of Appeals in the cases heretofore cited, and by Judge
Barclay in the Carson-Rand case, because, in the first place, nothing
is gained for the State by holding the contract invalid, since a cor-
poration may indefinitely continue to violate the law, and its contracts
will not be declared unlawful unless the other party thereto, being sued
thereon, takes advantage of the non-compliance with the statute; in
the second place, because the rule announced by Judge Goode is rea-
sonable and just and serves the purpose of the Legislature quite as
well, 4s the State may at any time, irrespective of any civil action by
the corporation, enforce the pecuniary penalty against the corpora-
tion. JOSPH H. GRAND.
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